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Joint Design of Optimal Cooperative Jamming and
Power Allocation for Linear Precoding
Jun Yang, Il-Min Kim, Senior Member, IEEE, Dong In Kim, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Linear precoding and cooperative jamming for mul-
tiuser broadcast channel is studied to enhance the physical layer
security. We consider the system where multiple independent
data streams are transmitted from the base station to multiple
legitimate users with the help of a friendly jammer. It is assumed
that a normalized linear precoding matrix is given at the base
station, whereas the power allocated to each user is to be
determined. The problem is to jointly design the power allocation
across different users for linear precoding and the cooperative
jamming at the friendly jammer. The goal is to maximize a
lower bound of the secrecy rate, provided that a minimum
communication rate to the users is guaranteed. The optimal
solution is obtained when the number of antennas at the friendly
jammer is no less than the total number of antennas at the users
and eavesdropper. Moreover, a suboptimal algorithm is proposed,
which can be applied for all the scenarios. Numerical results
demonstrate that the proposed schemes are effective for secure
communications.
Index Terms—Cooperative jamming, linear precoding, mul-
tiuser broadcast channel, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENSURING security of communications at the physicallayer has attracted considerable attention in recent years
[1]–[7]. Different from the traditional cryptographic algo-
rithms at higher layers, physical layer security exploits the
physical characteristics of the wireless transmission medium.
For example, secrecy capacity was studied in [8]–[10] from
the information-theoretic perspective. Since secrecy capacity is
unknown in many cases, the achievable secrecy rate or signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) was also adopted in
some work as a metric of security [1]–[4], [11], [12].
Physical layer security for multiple antenna systems and/or
relay networks has been studied in [3], [7], [13]–[17]. Among
the existing work, the strategy of artificial noise or Cooperative
Jamming (CJ) is one of the effective approaches, which was
studied by Goel and Negi in [7], [13] and later by many other
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researchers [11], [12], [18], [19]. In most of existing works
on CJ, a most typical scenario is that the source transmits
only a single data stream to a single legitimate user in the
presence of one or multiple eavesdroppers, such as [1]–[3], [5].
In practice, however, multiple independent data streams may
be transmitted from the source to multiple legitimate users,
such as in multiuser broadcast channels, which has been a
very active research topic over the last decade. In the multiuser
broadcast channel, the eavesdropper may be interested in
any particular stream transmitted by the Base Station (BS).
Therefore, it is important to ensure that all the streams from
the BS should be kept confidential from the eavesdropper.
The zero-forcing approach solely carried out by the BS has
major limitations compared to the scheme of using CJ, since
it requires the number of antennas at the BS should be no
less than the total number of antennas at the eavesdropper and
the legitimate users. Also, the power required for zero-forcing
approach should be no less than a power budget. Using CJ,
the BS can benefit from the friendly jammer since the total
instantaneous power could be increases significantly. Also, the
CJ can be very effective since the friendly jammer can be
selected as the terminals who are close to the eavesdropper
but far from the intended receivers.
In the literature, the research on practical algorithms for
physical layer security in multi-user multi-stream broadcast
channels is limited. When the eavesdroppers’ channels are
known, which is a common assumption in the area of physical
layer security [3], [6], [20]–[24], it was shown in [3], [11],
[12] that jointly designing the linear precoding at the BS and
the optimal CJ is very difficult [3], [11], [12]. Very recently,
in [11], [12], some optimal CJ algorithms were studied under
the assumption that some existing linear precoding/decoding
schemes are applied at the BS and the legitimate users.
However, the algorithms in [11], [12] are somewhat limited
in the sense that the linear precoding matrix at the base
station is totally independent of the CJ, meaning that no
joint optimization between the BS and the friendly jammer
is considered at all. However, fully joint design of linear
precoding matrix and the CJ is very difficult. Actually, even in
the case of conventional non-secure communications with no
security conditions or no eavesdropper, deriving truly optimal
linear precoding matrix is generally very difficult and remains
as an open problem. Addressing such shortcoming, in this
paper, we investigate joint designing of the CJ and the power
allocation of linear precoding matrix.
In this paper, we assume that the BS is able to collect the
channel information associated with the users, with which the
BS can pre-determine a normalized linear precoding matrix
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Fig. 1. System model.
except an individual power allocation to each user. Then the
power allocation is jointly optimized with the CJ. Also, we
assume the eavesdropper who has multiple antennas could
maximize the SINR for each data stream using optimal receive
beamforming [3], [25]–[29]. We assume that each user has one
antenna, and the eavesdropper is the legitimate terminal who
is currently unscheduled in the downlink. Thus, the channel of
eavesdropper is assumed known to the friendly jammer since
the eavesdropper is actually an active node in the wireless
network whose channel can be monitored. In the area of
physical layer security, this is a widely adopted common
assumption [3], [6], [20]–[24].
Notation: (·)H denotes the operator of conjugate transpose
and E[·] is the expectation operator. For positive Hermitian
matrix, (·) 12 denotes the Hermitian squared root. 0N×M de-
notes an N ×M matrix with all zero elements; IN denotes
an N × N diagonal matrix with diagonal elements equal to
one; and C denotes the set of complex numbers. Moreover,
we use A := B to denote that A by definition equals
to B, and use A =: B to denote that B by definition
equals to A. The notation ‖ · ‖ denotes the Frobenius norm,
and ‖ · ‖1 denotes the L1 norm. Furthermore, the curled
inequality symbols  and  (and their strict forms ≺ and ≻)
are used to denote generalized inequalities: between vectors,
they represent componentwise inequalities; between Hermitian
matrices, they represent matrix inequalities. Finally, for two
matrices A ∈ CN×N and B ∈ CM×M , diag{A,B} denotes
the matrix
[
A 0N×M
0M×N B
]
.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider a multiuser broadcast channel as shown in Fig.
1, in which the BS transmits K independent1 data streams
to K users, each of whom has a single antenna. We assume
the BS, the friendly jammer (FJ), and the eavesdropper (Eve)
have N , L, and Z antennas, respectively. The channels from
the BS to the users, the BS to Eve, the FJ to the users, and
the FJ to Eve are denoted by F = [f1, · · · ,fK ] ∈ CN×K ,
H = [h1, · · · ,hZ ] ∈ CN×Z , B = [b1, · · · , bK ] ∈ CL×K ,
and G = [g1, · · · , gZ ] ∈ CL×Z , respectively. The CJ is
composed of several independent noises and it is denoted by
1This is widely adopted assumption for multi-user broadcast channels.
J(t) =
∑Z
j=1 qjzj(t), where qj denotes the weight vector for
the j-th noise and zj(t) is the j-th independently generated
Gaussian noise with zero mean and E[|zj(t)|2] = 1. Let W
denote the precoding matrix used at the BS, which is designed
for transmitting multiple data streams to multiple users with
single receive antennas. In the case of conventional communi-
cations with no security conditions or no eavesdropper, there
are many different ways to design W . For example, W can
be obtained in closed-form based on zero-forcing or minimum
mean squared error (MMSE) criterions [30]. Or, W might
be optimized while guaranteeing the QoS requirements of the
users. Unfortunately, in most scenarios where the users’ QoS
constraints are given, deriving truly optimal W is generally
very difficult and optimal solutions are generally unknown
[31]–[33].2
For secure communications, there might be few different ap-
proaches in determining W . A simplest approach is to design
W simply as in the conventional non-secure communications.
A clear benefit is that one can utilize the existing results in
the literature. In this approach, however, the security issue
or jamming the eavesdropper is totally up to the CJ only
(i.e., J(t)), with no coordination with precoder W . Thus, the
overall performance can be limited. This approach was used
in [11], [12]. The other extreme approach is that one tries to
perfectly carry out joint optimization of W and J(t). If such
optimization were doable, a clear benefit would be as follows:
the system could be perfectly optimized and the security issue
would be addressed by joint optimal coordination of W and
J(t). Unfortunately, this approach is analytically intractable in
general. In fact, as discussed above, even optimizing only W
for the conventional (non-secure) communications is generally
very difficult when the users’ QoS constraints are given.
In this paper, we attempt a balanced approach between
the two extremes. Specifically, we carry out partial joint
optimization of J(t) and W . To this end, we first rewrite
W as W = [
√
p1u1, · · · ,√pKuK ], where {‖uk‖ = 1 : k =
1, · · · ,K}. It is easy to see that pk can be interpreted as the
power allocated to the k-th user, and uk can be interpreted as
the normalized precoding vector designed for the k-th user.3
In this paper, we will carry out joint optimization of the power
allocation {pk} and CJ J(t). For {uk}, one can use any
existing results derived for the non-secure communications.
Compared to the naive approach (with no joint optimization as
in [11], [12]), in our approach, the security issue is addressed
by joint optimal coordination of {pk} and J(t). Thus, our
approach outperforms the naive approach, which will be
numerically demonstrated in Section IV. Compared to the full
joint optimization of J(t) and W , which seems analytically
intractable, our approach is analytically tractable.
Note that if L < Z , the degrees of freedom (DoF) at Eve
is larger than the DoF at FJ. Then it is always possible for
2Typically, only some iterative optimization methods were proposed, which
are not necessarily provide the truly optimal performance [33].
3The expression W = [√p1u1, · · · ,√pKuK ] has been used in many
existing works in the non-secure communication to design W , such as in [32],
[34]–[36]. For example, in [34], the power assignment problem was considered
to design {pk : k = 1, · · · ,K} given {uk : k = 1, · · · , K}. In [32], [35],
[36], alternating optimizing {uk : k = 1, · · · ,K} and {pk : k = 1, · · · ,K}
were studied.
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Eve to cancel any jamming signal transmitted by FJ. In order
to ensure that CJ be an effective approach, we will always
assume L ≥ Z throughout this paper and this assumption will
not be explicitly stated in what follows.
B. Problem Formulation
The SINR of the k-th stream at the k-th user can be written
as
SINRk(p,J(t)) =
pk|fHk uk|2∑
i6=k pi|fHk ui|2 + bHk Σbk + σ2
:= SINRk(p,Σ),
(1)
where Σ :=
∑Z
j=1 qjq
H
j ∈ CL×L is the covariance matrix
of CJ4, and σ2 is the noise variance at the users. Note that
the SINR depends on J(t) only through Σ. This means
that the design of J(t) can be reduced to the design of
Σ. Thus, we will use notation SINRk(p,Σ) rather than
SINRk(p,J(t)). In order to guarantee reliable transmission
to each user, we design the power allocation vector p =
[p1, p2, · · · , pK ]T and the CJ, J(t), such that the commu-
nication rate to user k is larger than a given rate threshold,
i.e., Ck := log (1 + SINRk(p,Σ)) ≥ C =: log(1 + τ),
where C is the rate threshold and τ is the corresponding QoS
threshold for each user. On Eve’s side, using her multiple
antennas, it is possible for Eve to maximize the output
SINR of the k-th stream using optimal receive beamforming,
w˜k =
(
HHWWHH + σ2I +GHΣG
)−1
HHuk. The
output SINR can be written as
SINRe,k(p,Σ) :=
|√pkw˜Hk HHuk|2
w˜Hk
(∑K
i6=k piH
Huiu
H
i H + σ
2I +GHΣG
)
w˜k
=
pku
H
k H
H
(∑K
i=1 piH
Huiu
H
i H + σ
2I +GHΣG
)−1
Huk
1− pkuHk HH
(∑K
i=1 piH
Huiu
H
i H + σ
2I +GHΣG
)−1
Huk
.
(2)
Note that in the above expression of SINR, the other (K − 1)
streams except the particular k-th stream are considered as
interferences when Eve tries to decode the k-th stream.
A possible optimization problem is to maximize the min-
imum secrecy rate under a total power constraint5 of linear
precoding and CJ, and constraints on the minimum rates to
the users:
max
p,Σ
{min
k
Cse,k} s.t.
K∑
k=1
pk + tr(Σ) ≤ Ptot, Ck ≥ C,
pk ≥ 0, k = 1, · · · ,K,
(3)
where Cse,k = [log(1 + SINRk(p,Σ))− log(1 + SINRe,k(p,Σ))]+
is the secrecy rate for the k-th user’s data stream and Ptot
4The number of qj is Z because the expression of SINRUe,k is a function
of Σ only through GHΣG, which is a Z × Z matrix.
5Note that individual power constraint of the BS and the jammer might
also be of interest, which will be considered in further work.
denotes the maximum available power for both FJ and
BS. This problem (3) is generally very difficult to solve
because it is non-convex. For analytical tractability, we obtain
a lower-bound of the secrecy rate and use it as the cost
function. To this end, we first consider an upper bound of
SINRe,k(p,Σ) as
SINRUe,k(pk,Σ) =
pku
H
k H
H
(
pkH
Huku
H
k H + σ
2I +GHΣG
)−1
Huk
1− pkuHk HH
(
pkH
Huku
H
k H + σ
2I +GHΣG
)−1
Huk
,
(4)
where it is easy to prove that SINRe,k(p,Σ) ≤
SINRUe,k(pk,Σ) and the equality holds when∑K
i=1 piH
Huiu
H
i H = pkH
Huku
H
k H . Using the upper
bound SINRUe,k(p,Σ), it is possible to obtain a lower bound
of the achievable secrecy rate: Cse,k ≥ CL,1se,k , where
CL,1se,k =
[
log(1 + SINRk(p,Σ))− log(1 + SINRUe,k(pk,Σ))
]+
.
(5)
If CL,1se,k is used as the cost function, the optimization problem
is given by
max
p,Σ
{min
k
CL,1se,k} s.t.
K∑
k=1
pk + tr(Σ) ≤ Ptot, Ck ≥ C,
pk ≥ 0, k = 1, · · · ,K.
(6)
Unfortunately, this problem is still difficult to solve in general.
Thus, we lower-bound CL,1se,k again. Specifically, from Ck =
log(1 + SINRk(p,Σ)) ≥ C, we have CL,1se,k ≥ CL,2se,k, where
CL,2se,k = [C− log(1+SINRUe,k(pk,Σ))]+. When CL,2se,k is used
as the cost function, the optimization problem is given by
max
p,Σ
{min
k
CL,2se,k} s.t. ‖p‖1 + tr(Σ) ≤ Ptot, Ck ≥ C,
pk ≥ 0, k = 1, · · · ,K.
(7)
Finally, from maxp,Σ{mink CL,2se,k} =[
C −minp,Σmaxk log(1 + SINRUe,k(pk,Σ))
]+
, the problem
(7) is equivalent to the following:
min
p0,Σ
{
max
k
SINRUe,k(pk,Σ)
}
s.t. ‖p‖1 + tr(Σ) ≤ Ptot,
SINRk(p,Σ) ≥ τ, k = 1, · · · ,K.
(8)
In the rest of the paper, we focus on solving the problem
(7) or its equivalent form (8). We will later show that when
L ≥ K + Z , the solution to (7) is also the solution to (6).
Unfortunately, the optimization problems (7) and (8) are still
non-convex since both SINRUe,k(pk,Σ) and SINRk(p,Σ) are
non-convex functions. Thus, it is generally not possible to
directly solve (7) or (8). In the next section, the solutions to
(7) or (8) are studied.
Remark: In the sense of detection error probability, the
optimal strategy for Eve is the maximum likelihood (ML)
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detection. However, due to the nonlinearity of ML detection,
directly analyzing ML detection is very difficult. In this
paper, instead of the ML detection, we assume Eve uses
beamforming, which is optimal in the sense of maximizing
the SINR. Then a lower bound of the secrecy rate based on
the SINR upper bound is maximized, which is equivalent to
minimizing the SINR upper bound. An interesting question
is, “Which gives better performance for Eve?” Let PU-SINRs
denote the symbol error rate (SER) when the optimal receive
beamforming to maximize the upper bound of the SINR is
used, and PMLs denote the SER for ML detection. We can
show that PMLs ≥ PU-SINRs . That is, using the upper bound of
the SINR is even more conservative than ML dedetection. The
proof is given in Appendix A.
III. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION AND COOPERATIVE
JAMMING
In this section, we investigate the solution to problem (7).
Specifically, we first give the necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of the solution to problem (7). Then we
derive the optimal solution to (7) when L ≥ K + Z . Finally,
we propose an alternating algorithm based on an asymptotic
approximation to get a suboptimal solution to (7), which does
not require the condition L ≥ K + Z .
A. Condition for Existence of Solution
The solution to (7) may not exist since the constraints
{SINRk(p,Σ) ≥ τ : k = 1, · · · ,K} may not be satisfied with
any p and Σ. Thus, studying the condition that the solution
exists is particularly important. In the following lemma, the
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the
solution is given.
Lemma 1: The solution to (7) exists if and only if
−σ2
(
∆
H
)−1
1K×1  0 and ‖−σ2
(
∆
H
)−1
1K×1‖1 ≤ Ptot,
(9)
where the k-th column of ∆ ∈ CK×K is defined as[
|fHk u1|
2
, · · · , |fHk uk−1|
2
,−
|fHk uk|
2
τ
, |fHk uk+1|
2
, · · · , |fHk uK |
2
]H
.
(10)
Proof: See Appendix B.
The condition given by (9) can be intuitively explained as
follows: For given p, since SINRk(p,Σ) is maximized when
Σ = 0, the solution of (7) exists if and only if there exists p
satisfying ‖p‖1 ≤ Ptot and SINRk(p) ≥ τ for all k, which are
actually the constraints in (7) when no CJ is transmitted. The
existence condition given by (9) is equivalent to the existence
for p that satisfies both ‖p‖1 ≤ Ptot and SINRk(p) ≥ τ for
all k.
From Lemma 1, one can know that the optimal solution
exists if and only if (9) is satisfied. However, with the condition
(9), the problem (7) is still non-convex and solving the
non-convex problem is still very difficult. In the following
subsection, we first derive a necessary condition for Σ to
be optimal when L ≥ K + Z and this condition turns out
to be very useful to obtain the actual optimal solution when
L ≥ K + Z .
B. Optimal Solution for L ≥ K + Z
In this subsection, we solve the problem (7) when L ≥
K + Z . We first derive a very important condition for the
optimality of CJ’s covariance matrix Σ. Specifically, it turns
out that designing CJ to be orthogonal to the users’ channel is
optimal when L ≥ K+Z . The result is given in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2: When L ≥ K + Z and the condition of (9) is
satisfied, the solution Σopt to problem (7) must be orthogonal
to the users’ channels, which means BHΣopt = 0K×L.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Note that in the existing literature for CJ design, designing CJ
such that it has nulls at the users, i.e., zero-forcing condition,
is generally suboptimal (rather than optimal) [1], [6]. The
result of Lemma 2 shows the if the jammer has enough DoF,
the best scheme for the CJ to do is to jam the eavesdropper
without interfering the users since the jammer cannot help the
legitimate users.
In the following theorem, we show that using the result of
Lemma 2, it is possible to transform the non-convex problem
(7) to a convex problem, which can be readily solved.
Theorem 1: When L ≥ K + Z and the condition of (9) is
satisfied, the optimal power allocation vector, popt, is given by
popt = −σ2
(
∆
H
)−1
1K×1  0, (11)
and the optimal CJ is obtained by Σopt = ΓHoptΓopt, where
Γ
H
opt =
[
G B
] [ GHG GHB
BHG BHB
]−1 [
Λ
1/2
0K×Z
]
∈ CL×Z ,
(12)
in which
Λ
1/2 = diag{
√
x1−1 − σ2, · · · ,
√
xZ−1 − σ2} ∈ CZ×Z .
(13)
Denoting new variable η := maxk{SINRUe,k(pk,Σ)}, the
vector x = [x1, · · · , xZ ]T is the solution to the following
convex optimization problem:
x =arg min
0Z×1≺x 1
σ2
1Z×1,η
η
s.t.
Z∑
j=1
φjxj
−1 ≤ Ptot + σ2
Z∑
j=1
φj − ‖popt‖1
pk
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2xj ≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K.
(14)
where ak = [ak1, ak2, · · · , akZ ]T := HHuk ∈ CZ×1
and φj is defined as the j-th diagonal element of[
GHG−GHB
(
BHB
)−1
BHG
]−1
.
Proof: See Appendix D.
In Theorem 1, the optimal power allocation, popt, for linear
precoding can be computed in closed form by (11), and the
optimal CJ Σopt can be computed in partially closed form by
(12) and (13), where xj are readily obtained by solving the
convex optimization problem of (14) numerically, e.g., using
the interior-point method. The proposed optimal algorithm can
also be implemented distributively, i.e., popt can be computed
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by the BS using only the information of F and then be
transmitted to the CJ. The CJ does not need to know F . After
receiving popt, the optimal CJ can be designed.
Finally, in the following lemma, we prove that the two
problems in (7) and (6) are equivalent when L ≥ K + Z ,
i.e., DoF at the FJ is equal to or larger than the total DoF at
the legitimate users and Eve.
Lemma 3: If L ≥ K + Z , the problems of (7) and (6) are
equivalent.
Proof: See Appendix E.
C. Suboptimal Solution
Note that the optimal algorithm given by Theorem 1 requires
the condition that L ≥ K + Z . If L < K + Z , the inversion
in (12) does not exists since the matrix [G,B] ∈ CL×(Z+K)
does not have full row rank. Thus, the main limitation of the
optimal algorithm in Theorem 1 is that it cannot be applied
when L < K+Z . Also, note that the condition BHΣ = 0 in
Lemma 2 is no longer a necessary condition for optimality of
Σ in the case of L < K+Z , which can be intuitively explained
as follows. To make the conditionBHΣ = 0 satisfied, K DoF
have been used for the FJ. Then the residual DoF at the FJ
to design CJ are just (L − K), which are less than Z when
L < K + Z . In this case, Eve can easily null any CJ since
Eve has more DoF. Thus, the CJ is not effective anymore by
BHΣ = 0 when L < K + Z . This result is consistent with
what is known in the literature, i.e., zero-forcing is not optimal
in general. Consequently, in the case of L < K + Z , the CJ
should be designed such that some power of jamming signal is
leaked to the users in order to effectively interfere Eve, rather
than zero-forcing. Unfortunately, the optimal solution to (7)
when L < K + Z is very difficult to obtain, because it is
non-convex.
In this subsection, we propose a suboptimal algorithm that
does not require the condition L ≥ K + Z , which means
the suboptimal algorithm can be always used whether L is
greater than K +Z or not. The proposed suboptimal solution
is based on alternating algorithms. Note that the well-known
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm and iterative water-
filling algorithm [37] are examples of the alternating opti-
mization algorithms. In particular, the alternating optimization
method is a common approach to handle non-convex problems
[35], [38]–[40].
The first step is to reformulate the problem (7) as an
equivalent optimization problem. We therefore consider its
equivalent problem (8). Since the rank of Σ is Z , we can
always write6 Σ = ΓHΓ where Γ ∈ CZ×L. Moreover, if we
define ck := Γbk, then ‖ck‖2 = bHk Σbk is the amount of CJ
power received by the k-th user. Using this notation, the opti-
mal p and Σ of problem (8) can be denoted as functions of Γ
and ck as p({ck}) = −(∆H)−1[‖c1‖+σ2, · · · , ‖cK‖+σ2]T
and Σ = ΓHΓ. The optimal {ck : k = 1, · · · ,K} and Γ are
6Let the eigenvalue decomposition of Σ be Σ =
V˜ diag{Λ˜, 0(L−Z)×(L−Z)}V˜ H , where Λ˜ is a Z × Z diagonal matrix.
Then we can get Γ = [Λ˜
1
2 ,0Z×(L−Z)]V
H ∈ CZ×L.
obtained by the following non-convex optimization problem:
min
Γ,{ck},{xj},η
η
s.t. GHΓH = [Λ1/2,0]TV H , bHk Γ
H = cHk , k = 1, · · · ,K,
Λ
1/2 = diag{x1, x2, · · · , xZ}, xj ≥ 0, j = 1, · · · , Z,
tr{ΓHΓ} − ‖(∆H)−1[‖c1‖+ σ2, · · · , ‖cK‖+ σ2]T ‖1 ≤ Ptot,
δHk [‖c1‖+ σ2, · · · , ‖cK‖+ σ2]T
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
σ2 + x2j
≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K,
(15)
where δk is the k-th row of −(∆H)−1. Note that problem (15)
is equivalent to the problem (8); thus, it does not require any
condition such as L ≥ K+Z . Unfortunately, directly tackling
(15) is still very difficult. This is because Λ1/2 defined by
(13) is non-convex in xj . Also, the third constraint of (15) is
non-convex in xj and η. Even if we assume other variables
are fixed except xj , the problem (15) becomes non-convex in
xj , which is very difficult to solve.
In the following, based on (15), we propose an alternating
algorithm which is asymptotically optimal. Specifically, we
consider the asymptotic situation Ptot →∞, which means that
the total power of FJ and BS can be large. Before proposing
an asymptotically optimal algorithm, in the following lemma,
we first derive an important property of optimal {xj} when
Ptot →∞.
Lemma 4: When the condition of (9) is satisfied, the
optimal solution {xj} to the problem (15) must satisfy
limPtot→∞ xj →∞, j = 1, · · · , Z .
Proof: See Appendix F.
When Ptot → ∞, it follows from Lemma 4 that
limPtot→∞
x2j
σ2+x2
j
= 1. Using this asymptotic result in (15), it
is possible to derive an asymptotic version of the alternating
algorithm. Denoting c˜ := [‖c1‖2, · · · , ‖cK‖2]T , we can write
p = [p1, p2, · · · , pK ]T , where pk = δHk (c˜ + σ21). Also, we
write Σ(Γ) = ΓHΓ, where Γ can be determined by given
c˜ and {xj : j = 1, · · · , Z}. Then we propose an alternating
algorithm to obtain c˜ and {xj : j = 1, · · · , Z}.
Alternating Algorithm:
• Initialize c˜ = 0.
• In each iteration:
- Step 1: Given c˜, {xj : j = 1, · · · , Z} are updated
by the following convex optimization problem:
{xj} = arg{xj} min{xj≥0},Γ,η η
s.t. GHΓH = [diag{x1, · · · , xZ},0]T ,
tr{ΓHΓ} ≤ Ptot −
K∑
k=1
δHk (c˜ + σ
2
1),
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
x2j
≤ η
δHk (c˜ + σ
21)
, k = 1, · · · ,K,
[
bH1 Γ
H
Γb1, · · · , bHKΓHΓbK
]T
 c˜.
(16)
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- Step 2: Given {xj : j = 1, · · · , Z}, c˜ is updated by
the following convex optimization problem:
c˜ =argc˜ min
c˜,Γ,η
η
s.t. GHΓH = [Λ1/2,0]T ,[
bH1 Γ
H
Γb1, · · · , bHKΓHΓbK
]T
 c˜
tr{ΓHΓ}+
K∑
k=1
δHk (c˜+ σ
2
1) ≤ Ptot,
0 ≤ δHk (c˜+ σ21) ≤
η∑Z
j=1
|akj |2
x2
j
, k = 1, · · · ,K.
(17)
Note that above alternating algorithm must converge to a
critical point, since in each step the value of objective function
is monotonically decreasing and the optimal value is bounded.
More importantly, the proposed alternating algorithm does not
require any condition on the number of antennas at FJ, and
thus, it can be applied to both L ≥ K + Z and L < K + Z .
Although the alternating algorithm gives a suboptimal so-
lution to (8), we can prove that if L ≥ K + Z , the proposed
alternating algorithm is asymptotically optimal as Ptot → ∞,
which is given in the following Lemma:
Lemma 5: When L ≥ K + Z and the condition (9) is
satisfied, the proposed alternating algorithm is asymptotically
optimal in the sense that as Ptot → ∞, its solution converges
to the optimal solution.
Proof: See Appendix G.
From Lemma 5, one knows that, when L ≥ K + Z , the
proposed alternating algorithm is asymptotically optimal in
the sense of Ptot → ∞. Then a natural question arising is
whether the proposed alternating algorithm is still asymp-
totically optimal in any sense when L < K + Z . In the
following, we answer this question. Specifically, the answer is
that, when L < K + Z , the proposed alternating algorithm is
asymptotically optimal in the sense of B → 0 and Ptot →∞.
Note that B → 0 is an important asymptotic case for the
following reason. As discussed before, when L < K +Z , the
zero-forcing is not optimal, meaning that, when L < K + Z ,
the jamming signal must be received by the users with the
optimal CJ. Thus, when L < K + Z , using CJ becomes
more effective only when the channel B from FJ to the users
becomes weaker, i.e., B → 0. On the other hand, when
L < K+Z , if B →∞, using CJ is not an effective approach
because the users will be significantly affected by the jamming
signal. When L < K + Z , therefore, B → 0 is an important
asymptotic case where adopting the approach of CJ is justified
and recommended.
In order to show the asymptotic optimality of the proposed
alternating algorithm in the sense ofB → 0 and Ptot →∞, we
first study the extreme case that the channel B is completely
blocked, i.e., B = 0 and Ptot →∞.
Lemma 6: If B = 0 and the condition of (9) is satisfied,
the asymptotically optimal solution to (8) when Ptot →∞ can
be obtained by the following convex optimization problem:
min
Γ,{xj},η
η s.t. GHΓH = [Λ1/2,0]TV H ,
tr{ΓHΓ} − σ2‖(∆H)−11‖1 ≤ Ptot,
pk
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
x2j
≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K.
(18)
Proof: Substituting B = 0 into (15) and using the
asymptotic result σ2 + x2j → x2j , it is easy to see that
{ck = 0 : k = 1, · · · ,K} is optimal. Then we obtain (18),
which is a convex optimization problem of Γ, {xj}, and η.
When B = 0, the result of Lemma 6 can be directly used.
On the other hand, for the case of B → 0 (but B 6= 0)
which we are interested in, the result of Lemma 6 cannot be
directly used since the interference to the legitimate users must
be taken into account. The usefulness of Lemma 6 is that it
can be used to prove an asymptotic optimality of the proposed
alternating algorithm for the case B → 0.
In the following lemma, we prove that the solution obtained
by the proposed alternating algorithm converges to the asymp-
totically optimal solution in Lemma 6 when B → 0.
Lemma 7: When B → 0, the proposed alternating algo-
rithm in (16) and (17) is asymptotically optimal in the sense
that its solution converges to the optimal solution of Lemma
6 as Ptot →∞.
Proof: See Appendix H.
From the results of Lemmas 5 and 7, the proposed alternating
algorithm can be considered as a very effective suboptimal
method. Specifically, if L ≥ K + Z the performance of
the proposed alternating algorithm converges to the optimal
performance given by Theorem 1 as Ptot → ∞. Also, if
L < K + Z and the channel B between FJ and legitimate
users is weak, the performance of the proposed suboptimal
algorithm converges to optimal performance given by Lemma
6 when Ptot →∞. These results will be numerically confirmed
in Section IV.
D. Comparison with Existing CJ
Most of the existing work on CJ, such as [1]–[3], [5], did
not consider multiple users or multiple data streams. Only
recently, the design of CJ for multiple users with multiple
streams has been studied in [11], [12]. However, the problem
of (7) and the obtained results are substantially different
from those of the existing CJ methods such as [11] and
[12]. In [11], the problem of minimizing the CJ power was
considered when multiple eavesdroppers existed. Since the
cost function considered in [11] is different from that of this
paper, the CJ solution in [11] is not comparable with the
results in this paper. Also, the limitation of [11] is that the
obtained CJ power could be very high, which may not be
practical. On the other hand, the problem in [12] is similar
to problem (8) of this paper: the problem is to minimize the
maximum achievable SINR at Eve subject to the CJ power is
constrained. The differences between [12] and this paper are as
follows: First, the optimization problems are different. In [12],
we considered to minimize the total power under the SINR
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constraints on legitimate users and eavesdropper, However, in
(8) , joint design of the power allocation and CJ is considered
to minimize a upper bound of the SINR at eavesdropper.
Furthermore, we also give an equivalent formulation of our
design problem in terms of the lower bound of the achievable
secrecy rate. Second, the precoding matrix W was assumed
to be known in [12], which means that no joint optimization
was considered at all between the BS and the FJ. Since fully
joint design of W and CJ is analytically intractable in general,
we consider a balanced problem in this paper to design the
CJ and partial W . Furthermore, in [12] the CJ was simply
made orthogonal to the users’ channel without proving its
optimal sense. On the other hand, in this paper, it is proved
that such zero-forcing is optimal only when L ≥ K + Z .
We also consider the case L < K + Z which is much more
difficult than L ≥ K+Z and an asymptotic optimal algorithm
is derived. Moreover, in [12] the SINR in the form of (2) was
used in the objective function, rather than the upper bound
of the SINR of (4), meaning that the results of [12] might be
rather optimistic from the perspective of the users. If the upper
bound of the SINR is used in [12], it can be shown that the
result of [12] is a special case of the result in this paper.
Lemma 8: When the upper bound of the SINR (4) is used
in the problem [12, Eq. (1)], by replacing R0 by I in [12],
the solution given by [12, Eq. (2) and Eq. (3)] is still valid,
which can be written as the same forms of (12) and (13), in
which x is determined by:
x = arg min
0Z×1≺x 1
σ2
1Z×1,η
η
s.t.
Z∑
j=1
φjxj
−1 ≤ σ2
Z∑
j=1
φj + P
max
tot ,
Z∑
j=1
|√pkakj |2xj ≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K,
(19)
where Pmaxtot is the CJ power constraint.
Proof: From the definition of a˜kj in [12], one can see
that a˜kj =
√
pkakj . Thus, when p is given, the problem (14)
becomes equivalent to [12, Eq. (3)] by denoting (Ptot−‖p‖1)
as Pmaxtot and (x−1j − 1) as λj .
Comparing (19) to (14), one can see that (14) is more general
than (19) in the sense that the individual power pk is optimized
in (14) along with (11), whereas the individual power is
assumed to be simply given in (19). If the power allocation
vector p in (14) is assumed to be given without optimization,
then (14) reduces to (19). Therefore, the result of [12] can be
seen as a special case of the result of this paper.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we investigate the performance of the
proposed algorithms numerically. We set the noise power
σ2 = −10 dBm. The channel matrices H , G, B, and F are
generated according to Rayleigh fading such that the power
gain of each element of the matrices is 0 dB. For the BS, we
assume the normalized linear precoding vectors are obtained
by the very well-known channel inversion algorithm [30], i.e.,
uk =
u˜k
‖u˜k‖ where u˜k is the k-th column of F (F
HF )−1.
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Fig. 3. Upper bound of the SINR at Eve versus the total power of FJ and
BS. Proposed optimal solution and the existing method [12].
Monte Carlo experiments consisting of 103 independent trials
are performed to obtain the average results. Note that the
complexity of optimal solution mainly depends on (i) the
computation of Σopt, which is O(L3), and (ii) solving x
by convex optimization problem with Z variables, which is
about O(Z3). For the proposed suboptimal algorithm, the
computational complexity of the iterative algorithm mainly
depends on (i) the number of iterations, which is around 5−15
in our examples, and (ii) the complexity of solving two convex
optimization problems, each with L2/2 + Z variables in an
single alternating iteration. So the computational complexity
is about O(L6), which is about 102 times of the optimal
algorithm in our numerical examples.
The optimal algorithm when L ≥ K + Z is investigated
in the first three examples and the minimized upper bound
of the SINR at Eve by (8) is demonstrated. We set N = 20,
K = 10, and L = 35 as default values, and change the values
of Ptot, τ , and Z in different examples. For comparison, we
also included the existing CJ in [12] using the upper bound
of the SINR of (4) as secure metric, which is also given in
(19). For (19), we assume half power of Ptot is allocated to
the BS and the other half of Ptot is allocated to the FJ, i.e.,
Pmaxtot =
1
2Ptot. In the first example, the number Z of antennas
at Eve, is varied from 5 to 20 and the upper bound of the SINR
defined by (4) is plotted in Fig. 2. From the figure, one can see
that the upper bound of the SINR increases by nearly 10 dB
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Fig. 5. Lower bound of secrecy rate versus the total power of FJ and BS.
when Z increases from 5 to 20. Also, the upper bound of the
SINR at Eve is lower when Ptot is larger or τ is lower. In the
second example, we vary Ptot from 15 dBm to 35 dBm, which
is shown in Fig. 3 for different cases of Z and τ . According
to the figure, increasing Ptot is an effective way to reduce the
upper bound of the SINR at Eve, enhancing the security of the
network. We can also see from Fig. 3 that upper bound of the
SINR increases if more antennas are employed at Eve. In the
third example, the QoS threshold, τ , for users is changed from
5 dB to 20 dB. The corresponding upper bound of the SINR
at Eve is shown in Fig. 4. It is shown that by increasing the
QoS for users, the upper bound of the SINR at Eve increases
as well. This is because the power of data streams received by
Eve increases and also the capability of CJ is limited since the
power for CJ is reduced. Note that in all the three examples,
the proposed optimal CJ is always better than the existing CJ
of (19), because the optimal power allocation between the BS
and FJ is jointly designed with CJ in the proposed algorithm.
In the next three examples, we investigate the proposed
suboptimal alternating algorithm and the maximum of the
lower bound of the secrecy rate by (7) is demonstrated. Each
element of channel B is generated such that the power gain
of each element of B is −30 dB. We set N = 10, K = 3,
Z = 15, and τ = 10 dB as default values, and change L
and Ptot in each example. First, we change Ptot for different
values of L, which is shown in Fig. 5. In the figure, the optimal
algorithm is plotted for L = 20 > K+Z and L = K+Z = 18
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Fig. 7. Lower bound of secrecy rate versus the channel B between FJ and
legitimate users.
for comparison, and the suboptimal alternating algorithm is
plotted for L = K + Z = 18 and L = 17 < K + Z . We also
included the lower bound of the secrecy rate when there is no
CJ. According to Fig. 5, the lower bound of the secrecy rate
is increasing when Ptot is increasing. From the case L = 18,
one can see that the proposed suboptimal alternating algorithm
converges to the optimal algorithm when Ptot is large, e.g.,
larger than 5 dBm in our example, the performance of two
algorithms is very close to each other. Next, we change L
from 15 to 21 and fix Ptot equals to 20 dBm or 40 dBm. The
resulting lower bound of the secrecy rate is shown in Fig.
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
−30
−25
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
L
Up
pe
r B
ou
nd
 o
f S
IN
R 
at
 E
ve
 (d
B)
 
 
Proposed Optimal (P
tot
=10 dBm, perfect CSI)
Proposed Optimal (P
tot
=20 dBm, perfect CSI)
Proposed Optimal (P
tot
=10 dBm, ξ=−10 dB)
Proposed Optimal (P
tot
=20 dBm, ξ=−10 dB)
Asymptotic L→∞ (P
tot
=10 dBm, perfect CSI)
Asymptotic L→∞ (P
tot
=20 dBm, perfect CSI)
No Jamming
Fig. 8. Imperfect CSI and asymptotic performance of L→∞.
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6. In the figure, the optimal algorithm is shown only when
L ≥ K+Z , whose performance is essentially the same as the
performance of the proposed alternating algorithm. One can
also see that the effect of transmitting CJ is severely limited
by the number L. For example, when L = 15 even if we
set Ptot = 40 dBm, the lower bound of the secrecy rate is
almost the same as the case when no CJ is transmitted, which
is close to 0 bps/Hz. Thus, the CJ is not very useful when L
is much lower than K + Z . Finally, letting K = 3, Z = 15,
and L = 17 < K + Z , we generate B according to Rayleigh
fading with different power gain, from 10 dB to −80 dB. The
performance of the suboptimal algorithm is plotted compared
with the asymptotic case B = 0 in Fig. 7. One can see that
as B → 0, the proposed suboptimal algorithm asymptotically
converge to the optimal performance whenB = 0. This means
even if L < K+Z , the proposed suboptimal algorithm can be
very effective when the channel between the FJ and legitimate
users is very weak.
In the last example, we considered the Eve’s channels
G and B are perturbed by a Gaussian noise with variance
ξ2 = −10 dB, i.e. Gˆ = G + ∆G, Bˆ = B + ∆B , where
G ∼ CN (0, I), B ∼ CN (0, I), ∆G ∼ CN (0, 0.1I), and
∆B ∼ CN (0, 0.1I). From the results in Fig. 8, one can see
that the performance of the proposed optimal CJ scheme dete-
riorates with imperfect CSI. However, the performance is still
much better than the case of no jamming. We also include the
performance limit for L→∞. When L→∞, the channels of
{bk} and {gj} tend to be uncorrelated. Thus, we have ΓHopt ≈(√
x−1
1
−σ2
|g
1
|2 g1, · · · ,
√
x−1
Z
−σ2
|gZ |2 gZ
)
and φj can be replaced by
1
|gj |2 since the matrix
[
GHG−GHB
(
BHB
)−1
BHG
]−1
reduces to diag{ 1|g
1
|2 , · · · , 1|gZ |2 } when L → ∞. However,
asymptotically 1‖gj‖2 → 0 as L → ∞. Thus, η → 0. From
Fig. 8, one can see that, as L increases, the performance of
the proposed optimal algorithm gets close to the performance
limit of L→∞.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed optimal and suboptimal algorithms for
joint design of the power allocation between different users
at BS and the CJ at the FJ to maximize a lower bound of
secrecy rate. Compared to existing works, our problem is more
general in the sense that joint optimizations are carried out. We
demonstrated the proposed CJ could effectively interfere Eve
to help the BS communicate confidentially with the legitimate
users. In particular, in order to make the CJ strategy effective,
it is important to employ enough number of antennas at the FJ.
Moreover, increasing the total power and choosing relatively
small τ could also enhance the security level. Finally, if the
channel B is weak, the CJ could also be effective even if
L < K + Z .
APPENDIX A
Let sk(t) denote the k-th stream with |sk(t)|2 = 1; then
the received signal of the k-th stream at Eve can be written
as r(t) =
∑K
k=1
√
pkH
Huksk(t) + n(t) + G
HJ(t). Note
that since J(t) is Gaussian, the term n(t) + GHJ(t) can
be seen as a colored Gaussian noise with covariance matrix
σ2I +GHΣG. Denoting ak =HHuk, the ML detection at
Eve can be written as
max
{sk(t):k=1,··· ,K}
1
det(pi
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)
)
· e−tr[(r(t)−
∑
K
k=1
√
pkaksk(t))
H
Σ
−1(r(t)−∑Kk=1√pkaksk(t))].
(A.1)
If we consider the upper bound of the SINR, the received
signal at Eve can be written as rk(t) =
√
pkH
Huksk(t) +
n(t) +GHJ(t). Then the ML detection at the eavesdropper
for the k-th stream can be written as
max
sk(t)
1
det(pi
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)
)
· e−tr[(rk(t)−√pkaksk(t))HΣ−1(rk(t)−√pkaksk(t))].
(A.2)
Let PU-MLs denotes the SER of (A.2). Then it is obvious that
PU-MLs ≤ PMLs .
Next, we prove that PU-SINRs = PU-MLs . Note that (A.2) is
equivalent to
min
sk(t)
‖
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)−1/2
rk(t)
−
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)−1/2√
pkaksk(t)‖2.
(A.3)
Let rˆk(t) :=
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)−1/2
rk(t) and aˆk :=
√
pk
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)−1/2
ak; then the ML estimate is
sˆk(t) =
aˆHk
‖aˆk‖2 rˆk(t). We can show that sˆk(t) ∼
CN
(
sk(t),
1
‖a˜k‖2
)
, and the SINR which is actually SNR, is
given by ‖a˜k‖2 = pkaHk
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)−1
ak.
On the other hand, by maximizing the upper bound of the
SINR, we get
pku
H
k H
H
(
pkH
Huku
H
k H + σ
2I +GHΣG
)−1
Huk
=
pka
H
k
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)−1
ak
1 + pkaHk
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)−1
ak
.
(A.4)
Then SINRUe,k(pk,Σ) = pkaHk
(
σ2I +GHΣG
)−1
ak. Thus,
ML decoding is equivalent to optimal receive beamforming
when the upper bound of the SINR is used, which means
PU-SINRs = P
U-ML
s ≤ PMLs .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The existence condition of (7) is equivalent to the existence
condition for p  0 and Σ that satisfies both ‖p‖1 + tr(Σ) ≤
Ptot and SINRk(p,Σ) ≥ τ . Note that ‖p‖1 ≤ Ptot − tr(Σ) ≤
Ptot and τ ≤ SINRk(p,Σ) ≤ SINRk(p,0). Thus, the exis-
tence condition for p is equivalent to the condition that satisfies
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‖p‖1 ≤ Ptot and τ ≤ SINRk(p,0), which is the traditional
non-secure problem for linear precoding design [35], [36].
The constraints τ ≤ SINRk(p,0) for k = 1, · · · ,K can be
written as ∆Hp + σ21  0. Thus, we can prove that ‖p‖1
is minimized when the equality in ∆Hp + σ21  0 holds.
Finally, the existence condition is ‖−σ2
(
∆
H
)−1
1‖1 ≤ Ptot
and ‖ − σ2
(
∆
H
)−1
1‖1  0.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We prove Lemma 2 by two steps. First, assuming Σ =
Γ
H
Γ, we reformulate the equivalent problem (8) so that
bHk Γ
H are denoted as new variables. Next, we prove
‖bHk ΓH‖2 = 0, for all k = 1, · · · ,K , are satisfied for
the optimal solution, which implies bHk Σbk = 0, for all
k = 1, · · · ,K . Thus, the property BHΣ = 0 holds.
A. Step 1: Reformulation of (8)
we can introduce another variable η as η =
maxk{SINRUe,k} and add the following new constraints:
pku
H
k H
H
(
pkH
Huku
H
k H + σ
2I +GHΣG
)−1
Huk ≤
η
1+η . Note that the CJ is only determined by G
H
ΣG
which is a Z × Z matrix; thus, the rank of Σ equals
to Z , which is smaller than L. Using ak = HHuk,
Σ = ΓHΓ, and Q = ΓG, from the result in
Appendix A, the SINR constraint at Eve is equivalent
to pkaHk
(
GHΣG+ σ2I
)−1
ak ≤ η, which can be written
as pkσ2
[
aHk ak − aHk QH
(
QQH + σ2I
)−1
Qak
]
≤ η.
We denote the eigenvalue decomposition of QQH as
QQH = V ΛV H , then
pk
σ2
aHk
[
I −Λ1/2 (σ2I +Λ)−1Λ1/2]ak
=
Z∑
j=1
(
1− λj
σ2 + λj
)
pk|akj |2
σ2
=
Z∑
j=1
pk|akj |2
σ2 + λj
,
(C.1)
where λj is the j-th eigenvalue of QQH . Next, we consider
the QoS constraints at the users:
pk|fHk uk|2∑
i6=k pi|fHk ui|2 + bHk Σbk + σ2
≥ τ
⇔ pk |f
H
k uk|2
τ
≥
∑
i6=k
pi|fHk ui|2 + ‖bHk ΓH‖2 + σ2 ⇔
[
|fHk u1|2, · · · , |fHk uk−1|2,−
|fHk uk|2
τ
, |fHk uk+1|2, · · · , |fHk uK |2
]
p
+ ‖bHk ΓH‖2 + σ2 ≤ 0.
(C.2)
Using the definition of ∆ ∈ CK×K , we can write all users’
SINR constraints together. Denoting ck = Γbk, the design
problem can be written as
min
{ck},p,Γ,η
η
s.t. GHΓH =
(
V Λ1/2
)H
, λj ≥ 0, j = 1, · · · , Z,
‖Γ‖2 + ‖p‖1 ≤ Ptot, bHk ΓH = cHk , k = 1, · · · ,K,
pk
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
σ2 + λj
≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K,
∆
Hp+
(‖c1‖2, · · · , ‖cK‖2)H + σ21  0, p  0.
(C.3)
Note that for any orthogonal matrix V˜ , we always have
‖ΓH V˜ ‖2 = ‖Γ‖2 and ‖ck‖2 = ‖bHk ΓH‖2 = ‖bHk ΓH V˜ ‖2.
Thus, we can simply remove V by replacing ΓHV by ΓH .
B. Step 2: Proving ‖ck‖2 = 0 for k = 1, · · · ,K
We first assume p is given. Denoting C = [c1, · · · , cK ],
we have
min
{ck},Γ,η
η s.t. GHΓH = Λ1/2, tr{ΓHΓ} ≤ Ptot − ‖p‖1,
BHΓH = CH , λj ≥ 0, j = 1, · · · , Z,
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
σ2 + λj
≤ η
pk
, k = 1, · · · ,K.
(C.4)
Note that the last constraint is only related to λj , which are
only used to determine Λ. Thus, we can first fix λj ; so Γ can
be obtained as a function of λj as follows:
min
Γ
tr{ΓHΓ} s.t.
[
GH
BH
]
Γ
H =
[
Λ
1/2
CH
]
. (C.5)
The solution to the above problem exists and has the following
closed form:
Γ
H =
[
G B
] [ GHG GHB
BHG BHB
]−1 [
Λ
1/2
CH
]
. (C.6)
Then we have tr{ΓHΓ} = ∑Zj=1 φjλj + ‖Φ1/222 C‖2,
where φj is the j-th diagonal element of Φ11,
Φ11 :=
{
GH
[
I −B
(
BHB
)−1
BH
]
G
}−1
, and
Φ22 :=
{
BH
[
I −G
(
GHG
)−1
GH
]
B
}−1
. The variable
Γ can be replaced so that the residual variables are C, η, p,
and λj :
min
p0,λj≥0,C
η
s.t. pk
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
σ2 + λj
≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K,
Z∑
j=1
φjλj + ‖Φ1/222 C‖2 + ‖p‖1 ≤ Ptot,
∆
Hp+
(‖c1‖2, · · · , ‖cK‖2)H + σ21  0.
(C.7)
Based on the above problem, we can prove that ‖ck‖2 =
0 as follows: First of all, relax the constraint ∆Hp +
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(‖c1‖2, · · · , ‖cK‖2)H + σ21  0 to ∆Hp + σ21  0, then
it is easy to see that the optimal variables λj , C , and p must
satisfy Φ1/222 C = 0 in the following relaxed problem:
min
p0,λj≥0,C
η
s.t. pk
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
σ2 + λj
≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K,
∆
Hp+ σ21  0
Z∑
j=1
φjλj + ‖Φ1/222 C‖2 + ‖p‖1 ≤ Ptot.
(C.8)
Let C ′ = (c′1, · · · , c′K) and p′ be the optimal solution to
(C.7); then one can see that C′ can be any matrix that satisfies
Φ
1/2
22 C
′ = 0 since the optimal value does not change once
Φ
1/2
22 C
′ = 0 is satisfied. Furthermore, if the optimal p′ for
(C.7) also satisfies ∆Hp′+(‖c′1‖2, · · · , ‖c′K‖2)H+σ21  0,
the optimal solution to the relaxed problem (C.8) falls into
the feasible set of the problem (C.7). Obviously, {c′k = 0 :
k = 1, · · · ,K}, which satisfies Φ1/222 C′ = 0, is the optimal
solution to the relaxed problem (C.7); and thus, they must be
the optimal solution to (C.8). Therefore, we have {‖ck‖2 =
0 : k = 1, · · · ,K}, which implies that BHΣ = 0.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
From (C.8) with C = 0, we can get the following non-
convex optimization problem
min
p0,{λj}
η s.t. pk
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
σ2 + λj
≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K,
Z∑
j=1
φjλj + ‖p‖1 ≤ Ptot,∆Hp+ σ21  0.
(D.1)
By solving the above problem, the optimal power
allocation p can be obtained and the optimal
CJ Σ can be computed as Σ = ΓHΓ, where
Γ
H =
[
G B
] [ GHG GHB
BHG BHB
]−1 [
Λ
1/2
0
]
, in
which Λ1/2 = diag{√λ1, · · · ,
√
λZ} and λj is the j-th
eigenvalue of QQH . Using new variables xj = 1σ2+λj and
yk =
1
pk
, the above problem turns to
min
{yk>0},{0<xj≤1}
η
s.t.
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2xj − ηyk ≤ 0,
Z∑
j=1
φj(
1
xj
− σ2) +
K∑
k=1
1
yk
≤ Ptot,
yk ≤ |f
H
k uk|2
τσ2 + τ
∑K
i=1,i6=k
|fH
k
ui|2
yi
, k = 1, · · · ,K.
(D.2)
Note that the above problem is a non-convex optimization
problem because the last constraint is non-convex. However,
we can prove that the equality of the last constraint must
hold, which makes it possible to reformulate the non-convex
optimization problem to a convex optimization problem.
First, we prove that if {x1, · · · , xZ , y1, · · · , yK} is a
feasible point of (D.2) and the last constraint is inactive
for a particular k that yk < |f
H
k uk|2
τσ2+τ
∑
K
i=1,i6=k
|fH
k
ui|
2
yi
,
then another feasible point can be obtained by replacing
yk with y′k where y′k :=
|fHk uk|2
τσ2+τ
∑
K
i=1,i6=k
|fH
k
ui|
2
yi
> yk.
This is because all the constraints of (D.2) are satisfied:∑Z
j=1 |akj |2xj − ηy′k <
∑Z
j=1 |akj |2xj − ηyk ≤ 0, and for
any j 6= k, yj ≤ |f
H
j uj |2
τσ2+τ
(∑
K
i=1,i6=j,i6=k
|fH
j
ui|
2
yi
+
|fH
j
uk|
2
yk
) <
|fHj uj |2
τσ2+τ
(∑
K
i=1,i6=j,i6=k
|fH
j
ui|
2
yi
+
|fH
j
uk|
2
y′
k
) . Next,
we note that the new feasible point
{x1, · · · , xZ , y1, · · · , yk−1, y′k, yk+1, · · · , yK} achieves
the lower value of objective function than
{x1, · · · , xZ , y1, · · · , yK}, since
∑Z
j=1 φj(
1
xj
− σ2) +∑K
k=1
1
yk
is strictly decreasing with yk. Therefore, the
optimal {yk : k = 1, · · · ,K} must be achieved when the
last constraints for all k = 1, · · · ,K are active, which
means there are K variables and K equations for the
optimal yk = |f
H
k uk|2
τσ2+τ
∑
K
i=1,i6=k
|fH
k
ui|
2
yi
, k = 1, · · · ,K ,
which is equivalent to ∆Hp + σ21K×1 = 0. Thus,
we can solve the optimal p directly in closed form as
p = −σ2(∆H)−11K×1  0. Substituting the optimal p to
(D.1) and using xj as variables instead of λj , the obtained
problem is convex and then can be solved.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
First, it can be readily shown that (7) and (6) are equivalent
if Ck = C for all k. Then it is suffices to show that Ck = C
holds for the proposed scheme when L ≥ K + Z . Note that
in Lemma 2 of the paper, we have shown that BHΣopt = 0,
where Σopt is the optimal Σ in (7). Therefore, SINRk(p,Σopt)
is only a function of p. Furthermore, from Theorem 1 we
know that the optimal p in (7) can be computed by popt =
−σ2
(
∆
H
)−1
1K×1. Substituting popt to SINRk(p,Σopt), one
can readily verify that SINRk(popt,Σopt) = τ , which means
Ck = C.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
When Ptot → ∞, the third constraint of (15) is relaxed.
Therefore, we can rewrite (15) as:
min
Γ,{ck},{xj≥0},
max
k

pk
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
σ2 + x2j


s.t. GHΓH = [diag{x1, x2, · · · , xZ},0]T ,
bHk Γ
H = cHk , k = 1, · · · ,K,
(F.1)
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where pk = δHk [‖c1‖ + σ2, · · · , ‖cK‖ + σ2]T . Note that
maxk
{
pk
∑Z
j=1
|akj |2
σ2+x2
j
}
is a decreasing function of {xj}.
Thus, by increasing xj , the objective function of (F.1) can
always be decreased, which means if xj → ∞ for all
j = 1, · · · , Z is feasible, then xj → ∞ for all j = 1, · · · , Z
must be optimal. In order to prove that xj → ∞ for
all j = 1, · · · , Z is feasible, without loss of generality,
we can instead prove that for any given feasible point Γ
and {x1, x2, · · · , xZ}, one can always find another feasible
point Γ′ and {x1, x2, · · · , xj−1, x′j , xj+1, · · · , xZ} which can
achieve a lower or equal objective value compared to than
{x1, · · · , xZ}. Note that since the objective function of (F.1)
is non-decreasing in xj , we only need to prove that the solution
of Γ′ exists for {x1, x2, · · · , xj−1, x′j , xj+1, · · · , xZ}, where
x′j > xj . This is equivalent to proving that there exists
Γ
′ which satisfies GH(Γ′ − Γ)H = [diag{0, · · · , 0, x′j −
xj , 0, · · · , 0},0]T . Since Γ′ ∈ CZ×L, G ∈ CL×Z , and
L ≥ Z , the solution of GH(Γ′−Γ)H = [diag{0, · · · , 0, x′j −
xj , 0, · · · , 0},0]T must exist.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Denote the optimal xj : j = 1, · · · , Z of (15) as x∗j
and the optimal η as ηopt. Then it is easy to prove that
at least one of the following K constraints must be active:
pk
∑Z
j=1
|akj |2
σ2+(x∗
j
)2 ≤ ηopt, k = 1, · · · ,K . Thus, we can
write ηopt as ηopt = maxk
{
pk
∑Z
j=1
|akj|2
σ2+(x∗
j
)2
}
. Since in the
first iteration of Step 1 in (16) we set c˜ = 0 as the initial set-
ting, which is optimal when L ≥ K+Z , denoting the resulting
η of (16) with c˜ = 0 as ηinit, one can easily prove that ηsub ≤
ηinit ≤ maxk
{
pk
∑Z
j=1
|akj |2
(x∗
j
)2
}
, where ηsub denotes the ob-
tained η by the proposed suboptimal algorithm. Then we have
ηsub − ηopt ≤ maxk
{
pk
(∑Z
j=1
|akj |2
(x∗
j
)2 −
∑Z
j=1
|akj |2
σ2+(x∗
j
)2
)}
=
maxk
{
pk
(∑Z
j=1
σ2|akj |2
(x∗
j
)2[σ2+(x∗
j
)2]
)}
. When Ptot → ∞, we
have ηsub − ηopt → 0 since x∗j →∞. Thus, the proposed sub-
optimal algorithm is asymptotically optimal when L ≤ K+Z
and Ptot →∞.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
To prove Lemma 7, we use the same methodology as in
Appendix G. Denote the optimal η of (16) with c˜ = 0 as ηinit,
the optimal η of the proposed suboptimal algorithm as ηsub,
and the asymptotic optimal η of (15) when Ptot →∞ as ηasy.
Then it is easy to prove that ηasy ≤ ηsub ≤ ηinit. When B → 0,
the problem (15) turns to
min
Γ,{ck},{xj≥0},η
η
s.t. GHΓH = [Λ1/2,0]TV H ,
pk
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
σ2 + x2j
≤ η, k = 1, · · · ,K,
tr{ΓHΓ} − ‖(∆H)−1[‖c1‖+ σ2, ‖c2‖+ σ2, · · · , ‖cK‖+ σ2]T ‖1
≤ Ptot,
(H.1)
from which one can easily prove that ck = 0 is optimal. One
the other hand, when B → 0, the problem (16) with c˜ = 0
turns to
min
{xj},Γ,η
η
s.t. GHΓH = [diag{x1, · · · , xZ},0]T ,
xj ≥ 0, j = 1, · · · , Z,
tr{ΓHΓ} ≤ Ptot −
K∑
k=1
δHk (σ
2
1),
Z∑
j=1
|akj |2
x2j
≤ η
δHk (σ
21)
, k = 1, · · · ,K,
(H.2)
which is the same problem as (H.1). Thus, when Ptot → ∞,
the problem (15) converges to the problem of (16), which
means ηasy → ηinit. Since ηasy ≤ ηsub ≤ ηinit, we can conclude
that ηsub → ηasy as B → 0. Thus, the proposed suboptimal
algorithm is asymptotically optimal when B → 0.
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